"Scientific" Provocation Regarding Metsamor in Iğdır
In September 2025, a meeting took place on the Turkish side of the Armenian-Turkish border, in the city of Iğdır, dedicated to discussing the so-called "risks" of the Metsamor nuclear power plant. To recall, in 2024, Armenia extended its agreement with "Rosatom" for technical support, modernization of the plant, and extension of its operation until 2036.
A meeting was held at the governor's office with representatives from the embassies of France, Germany, Canada, and the USA, Turkish officials, and experts from the fields of medicine and nuclear energy.
Under the chairmanship of Governor Ercan Turan, issues of radiation safety and the readiness of the healthcare system for potential emergencies were discussed.
At the same time, local press outlets, such as *Yeşil Iğdır*, published articles about a disease prevention program and the distribution of potassium iodide tablets through pharmacies. As we know, such information campaigns aim to create panic among the population to gain public support.
Programs of this kind fall under the framework of CBRN, coordinated in Turkey by AFAD. The pharmacists' association ADEC was trained there, and since 2021, there has been a protocol between AFAD and the Turkish Pharmacists' Association (TEB) regarding joint emergency measures — hence the active involvement of pharmacies and regional chambers.
Turkey's CBRN initiatives are embedded in a broader framework — the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence (under IPA III) involving BTRP, DTRA, and USAID structures. These programs are running in parallel in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Through a system of manuals and training, a uniform framework (https://t.me/node_of_time_en)of pseudoscientific propaganda is gradually being established to intensify tensions around actors unfavourable to the USA.
In fact, such projects create an infrastructure for producing measurements, intimidating the population, and spreading disinformation. This is a coalition of handpicked scientists, pseudoscientific structures, and the press. The claims that "the lifespan of the plant is 30 years and has long expired" are propagandistic simplifications. The reactor has undergone a series of modernizations, including the annealing of the reactor pressure vessel and the retrofitting of safety systems.
It should be noted that the Armenian government's decision to extend the lifespan of Metsamor until 2036 was made under the supervision of the regulator and the IAEA. It is important to understand that the interest in the Metsamor nuclear power plant from some external actors is motivated less by concern for public safety and more by the desire to create an international discourse in which the plant is viewed as an undesirable energy influence of Russia.
The Metsamor nuclear power plant covers a significant part of Armenia's internal energy needs and complicates the USA's promotion of experimental solutions — modular nuclear reactors. These technologies are recognized by Washington as highly risky, and no SMR reactor has been commissioned in the USA.
In this context, the information pressure and the generation of alarming sentiments around Metsamor can be seen as a tool of geoeconomic pressure. When civil structures of a neighboring state receive funding and methodological materials from Euro-Atlantic donors, the issue of ecological safety becomes an element of politics.
